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MECHANIC'S LIENS-ALLOCATION AMONG MULTI-UNIT
PROJECTS UNDER VIRGINIA LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
In several recent decisions the Virginia Supreme Court and the Federal
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia have ruled on the validity
of blanket or joint mechanic's liens. The blanket lien, as may be inferred
from its name, is used to encumber more than one property unit in a single
action. Its benefit is sought when an artisan or material supplier has im-
proved two or more units in one transaction, and there has been a failure
of remuneration. The mechanic's lien gives the artisan a preferred status
among creditors, and therefore its immunity to attack is of critical import-
ance. The validity of blanket liens has been questioned in several recent
decisions where a partial release of the attached property adversely af-
fected the interests of parties other than the mechanic and his debtor, and
where a single lien is sought for benefits bestowed under separate con-
tracts. This comment will focus upon the application of the blanket lien
with respect to multi-unit development in Virginia, considering both the
typical subdivided property and its newer cousin, the condominium.
HI. HISTORY
The mechanic's lien is purely a creation of statute.' It had no existence
at common law and, independent of statute, 2 is unknown in equity.3 The
common law lien, whereby the workman was permitted to retain posses-
sion of chattels upon which he had labored, provided the basis for its
development.4
A mechanic's lien attaches and dates from the time the first work is
performed or the first materials are furnished under the contract giving rise
to it;- however, it is merely inchoate' until perfected by the filing of a
memorandum showing, inter alia, the amount of the claim, the due date,
1. Wallace v. Brumback, 177 Va. 36, 12 S.E.2d 801 (1941); See 57 C.J.S. Mechanic's Liens
§ 1 (1948).
2. "As early as 1792, Virginia recognized that the mechanic was a person deserving special
consideration [tax exemption-1792 Va. Acts, ch. 48, § 4] . . . . However, it was not until
1843 that Virginia gave the mechanic a preference as a creditor [1843 Va. Acts, ch. 76, § 1-
61." 17 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 307, 308 (1960).
3. M. BURKS, COMMON LAW AND STATUTORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, § 455, at 882 (4th ed.
T. M. Boyd 1952). (Hereinafter cited as BURKS) (footnotes added).
4. Id.
5. Merchants & Mechanics Say. Bank v. Dashiell, 66 Va. (25 Grattt.) 616, 625 (1874).
6. DeWitt v. Coffey, 150 Va. 365, 143 S.E. 710, 712 (1928).
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and a brief description of the property on which the lien is claimed.7 When
so perfected a security interest superior to the claims of most other credi-
tors is established in the burdened property. The lien is extinguished un-
less enforcement proceedings are initiated by filing a bill in equity within
six months of recordation of the memorandum or within sixty days from
the termination of work on the structure, whichever occurs later.8
Due to the statutory origin of mechanic's liens generally, their impact
and application vary among jurisdictions In Virginia, the correct rule of
construction is that there must be substantial compliance with the statu-
tory requirements relating to the creation of the lien 0 because it is in
derogation of the common law." Once a lien is created, however, the provi-
sions with respect to enforcement should be liberally construed.'2
Authority for the blanket lien is not specifically granted in the Virginia
statutes.'3 Rather, the blanket lien was judicially recognized and the condi-
tions appropriate to its application were enunciated by the court in
Sergeant v. Denby, ,4 under a law not materially different from the present
statute.'5 In Sergeant there was a single contract for the construction of two
neighboring buildings, for which one lump sum payment was to be made.
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
8. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
9. BURKS § 455, at 882 n. 1.
10. H.N. Francis & Co. v. Hotel Rueger, Inc., 125 Va. 106, 99 S.E. 69), 694 (1919).
11. Clement v. Adams Bros.-Paynes Co., 113 Va. 547, 75 S.E. 294, 2915 (1912) (quoting 20
A.&.E. Ency. of Law 278 (2d ed.)).
12. H.N. Francis & Co. v. Hotel Rueger, Inc., 125 Va. 106, 99 S.E. 690, 694 (1919).
13. In re Thomas A. Carey, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1976); SeE generally VA. CODE
ANN. § 43-3 (Repl. Vol. 1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
14. 87 Va. 206, 12 S.E. 402 (1890).
15. In re Thomas A. Carey, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 667, 672, n.3 (E.D. Va. 1976). The statute
used in Sergeant provided in part:
' . . Iall artisans, builders, mechanics, lumber dealers and oth-er [sic] performing
labor or furnishing materials for the construction, repair or improvement of any build-
ing or other property, shall have a lien, as hereinafter provided, upon such property,
and so much land therewith, as shall be necessary for the convenient use and enjoy-
ment of the premises, for the work done and materials furnished,' ... " § 3, Ch. 115,
Va. Code 1873.
412 F. Supp. at 672 n.3.
The current statute provides:
All persons performing labor or furnishing materials of the value of fifty dollars or
more, for the construction, removal, repair or improvement of any building or structure
permanently annexed to the freehold, and all persons performing any labor or furnish-
ing materials of like value for the construction of any railroad, shall have a lien, if
perfected as hereinafter provided, upon such building or structure, and so much land
therewith as shall be necessary for the convenient use and enjoyment thereof ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 43-3 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
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There was no provision for keeping separate accounts of labor or materials
furnished for each house. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the two
buildings were, in effect, one piece of work; and, in light of the circumstan-
ces, the lien must be joint or not at all.' 6 Emphasis was placed on the fact
that the work was performed under a single contract, a requirement further
defined in Gilman v. Ryan.'7 Additionally, the holding in Sergeant implied
that where the rights of third parties are involved potential inequities
might preclude the use of a blanket lien.'8
It was precisely this circumstance that led to the invalidation of a blan-
ket lien in Weaver v. Harland Corp. '9 In Weaver, after releasing several lots
from a lien against twenty lots, the lienors attempted to enforce their entire
claim against the remainder. In explaining its rationale for denying a blan-
ket lien under these circumstances, the court stated:
The policy of the law rests upon the same idea, viz.: to recompense...
the [mechanic for the] value of the work done, or materials furnished, in
the construction of the building whose value he has contributed to increase
[Ihe insuperable objection to permitting a lien for materials furnished
for several buildings to be included in one claim, with no specification of the
amount furnished for each, is, that it enables the lienholder to shift the
encumbrance at his pleasure, and to place the bulk of the claim upon any
building, to an amount far exceeding the value contributed to such building
. . . in derogation of the rights of other parties. (emphasis added). 0
To have allowed the lienors to shift the entire claim to less than all the
properties would have resulted in burdening the remainder for benefits not
received. The practical effect of this would be to force a third party, such
as an owner, to pay for work done on other properties in order to secure a
release of his own; or, similarly, the interests of other creditors would be
in contest with debts derived in part from improvements to unrelated
properties. To these parties the specter of insolvency and a forced sale is
rendered less haunting through the hope that revenues will be augmented
in proportion to their labors. By comparison, subordination to a foreign
indebtedness holds slight promise of full satisfaction.
16. Under the circumstances, allocation to each house was impossible.
17. 95 Va. 494, 28 S.E. 875 (1898). The court held that where separate buildings are erected
under separate and independent contracts, no single lien can attach under such contracts to
all the buildings. This was even extended to include instances of separate estimates.
18. See Weaver v. Harland Corp., 176 Va. 224, 234, 10 S.E.2d 547, 551 (1940). This issue
is further discussed below.
19. 176 Va. 224, 10 S.E.2d 547 (1940).
20. Id. at 231, 10 S.E.2d at 550.
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This objection is inapposite where only the owner and mechanic are
concerned. In this instance a partial release shifting the burden to fewer
than the entire number of parcels benefited is of little consequence, for the
mechanic would presumably grant such a release only after his own inter-
ests were adequately protected. 21
III. RECENT DECISIONS
Several recent decisions have more clearly defined the circumstances
under which blanket liens are deemed valid. Drawing from the precedents
of Sergeant and Weaver, the courts have established two controlling re-
quirements in addition to the broad statutory mandate that liens be appor-
tioned wherever possible.22 While discussed at length below, these require-
ments may be summarized as follows: (1) Release of less than all of the
units under a blanket lien is allowed only where third party interests (such
as mortgagees and other creditors) are not adversely affected; and (2)
Blanket liens should only be used where the several property units to be
attached were benefited as part of a single transaction, and there has been
no provision for a separate accounting of materials furnished for individual
units.
In a well-reasoned decision the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia acknowledged compliance and sanctioned the use of a
blanket lien in the case of In re Thomas A. Carey, Inc.3 Carey concerned
an action by two material suppliers to enforce blanket liens against a 50-
lot subdivision. Noting the absence of a release and the general delivery
of materials to the project as a whole, under either a single contract or an
open account, the court sustained the validity of the liens, notwithstand-
ing the involvement of third parties-in this instance the title insurer and
the permanent lender. Distinguishing Weaver, the court found the thrust
of that case not to be the general proscription of blanket liens where the
interests of third parties are concerned, but rather the denial of their use
where a partial release is also present.
Indeed, the court in Carey specifically recognized that the practice of
supplying materials generally for subdivision construction was not condu-
21. Such an action may be beneficial, allowing sale of some parcels and satisfaction of the
lien, a result more readily attainable than the sale of all units. In any case, the parties are
free to bargain without worry of injury to other creditors.
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
23. 412 F. Supp. 667 (E.D. Va. 1976).
24. One of the plaintiffs had used a model to roughly allocate the amounts required on a
per unit basis, but this was not found sufficiently specific to require a parcel-by-parcel lien.
Cf. Gilman v. Ryan, note 17 supra.
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cive to lot-by-lot allocation and unsuited to the application of separate
liens." However, where, as will be seen below, one or both of the require-
ments are not observed, the courts will disallow use of a blanket encumbr-
ance. Legal and practical ramifications associated with rigid enforcement
of these requirements are discussed below.
A. Allocation and Partial Release
The Virginia Code requires a memorandum to be filed allocating rele-
vant charges to the property sought to be encumbered." In effect, this
dictates allocation of the mechanic's lien to individual property units
whenever possible, thereby excluding usage of a blanket lien where individ-
ual liens can be achieved. Strict adherence to this section, then, precludes
apportionment of a blanket lien and, by implication, a release of less than
all the units. The explanation for this, in what has been called compelling
logic,21 is that a partial release of a blanket lien belies the claimed inability
to apportion which is the basis for the lien ab initio, thereby admitting
noncompliance with the statute and rendering the lien invalid.
Improper release of a blanket lien, similar to that in Weaver v. Harland
Corp., was found in the recent Virginia Supreme Court case of PIC Con-
struction Company v. First Union National Bank."9 Insolvency, foreclo-
sure, and sale had resulted in the conveyance of deeds of trust to the
construction lender and a private purchaser, both properties being subject
to a blanket lien filed by PIC Construction Company. As in Weaver, PIC
released one of several lots from its lien and, without reducing the amount
claimed, attempted enforcement against the remainder. Both purchasers
attacked the validity of the lien on the grounds of failure to apportion. The
court held that allocation of more than the proportional burden to the
purchasers' interests rendered the lien invalid.
It is noteworthy that while much of the court's discussion evolved from
PIC's failure to reduce the amount claimed, it ostensibly decided the case
solely on the grounds of release, at least in theory, declining to adjudicate
the issue of apportionment necessary to such a reduction." This was a
hollow pronouncement, for release and apportionment are two sides of the
same coin. Indeed the court recognized this fact, noting that "failure to
25. 412 F. Supp. at 674.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
27. As will be discussed later, there is some basis for allocation in condominiums, though
express authority is given only to the unit owner for purposes of release.
28. In re Thomas A. Carey, 412 F. Supp. 667, 674 (E.D. Va. 1976).
29. 218 Va. 915, 241 S.E.2d 804 (1978).
30. Id. at 920, 241 S.E.2d at 807.
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allocate, nevertheless, pervades the release issue . . "..- Put simply, the
disproportionate burden upon the third parties involved was the result of
PIC's failure to reduce the amount claimed subsequent to release of the
one lot. To have done so would have required apportionment. And had PIC
apportioned, it would have fallen victim to that "compelling logic" '3 2 result-
ing in invalidation of its lien.
The Virginia statute, then as interpreted by the courts, prohibits the
apportionment necessary to effect an equitable partial release of a blanket
lien in such situations. Therefore, the question seems relevant as to
whether an equitable means for apportioning blanket liens, and thereby
permitting partial release, is desirable or possible.
Surprisingly, the Virginia General Assembly has collaterally attacked
this problem in the recently enacted Virginia Condominium Act. 3 It pro-
vides that "[i]n the event that any lien . . . becomes effective against two
or more condominium units subsequent to the creation of the condomi-
nium, any unit owner may remove his condominium unit from that lien
by payment of the amount attributable to his condominium unit." Typi-
cally, the Master Agreement for the condominium as a whole provides a
formula based on the unit's proportional share of the project's entire square
footage. 31 If this mechanical method of allocation is deemed equitable for
the unit owners as against the mechanic, it should in fact be equally
appropriate where adopted for purposes of apportionment at the initiative
of the mechanic and applied to the developer or other parties. The use of
similar statutes in other jurisdictions as models for apportionment will be
examined below.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed a lower court judgment impos-
ing a proportional construction lien upon eight units of a thirty-five unit
condominium in Stevens Construction Corporation v. Draper Hall, Inc.36
These eight units were sold prior to institution of foreclosure proceedings.
Pursuant to an agreement with the mortgagee, Stevens and another lienor
were to receive a certain sum per unit sold in reduction of their respective
liens in the ensuing fifteen months, after which time the proceeds of fore-
closure would be applied toward the mortgage, with the remainder, if any,
going to satisfy the claims of the mechanic's lienors. Only six units were
31. Id.
32. See text at note 28 supra.
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.39 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1978); For a general discussion of the
act see 9 U. RICH. L. REv. 135 (1974).
34. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.46(b) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
35. Id. § 57-79.46(b), 79.83, 79.84.
36. 73 Wis.2d 104, 242 N.W.2d 893 (1976).
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sold in this period, not enough to satisfy Stevens. Following the Wisconsin
condominium statute," the trial court allowed apportionment of 1/35th of
the total lien claim to each of the eight units. Stevens appealed, seeking
enforcement of the entire balance of its claim against the first eight units
sold. In affirming the trial court's verdict, the court reasoned:
The general rule is that a blanket construction lien against an entire property
consisting of several parcels cannot be enforced in toto against less than all
of such parcels. The reason is that it would be inequitable to burden some
lesser portion of the liened premises with charges for labor and materials
which were not actually furnished to that particular parcel. The corollary to
this general rule is that, where the total labor and material costs for which
the blanket lien is claimed can reasonably be allocated to individual parcels,
the amount of the lien can be apportioned to these individual parcels on the
basis of such allocation and the liens enforced to this extent against individ-
ual parcels. (emphasis added).38
It is significant that the release executed pursuant to the sale of the six
units under the fifteen month agreement was not held to invalidate the
remainder of the lien. This, of course, was a direct outgrowth of the court's
decision confirming, as equitable, the manner of allocation, 9 in addition
to a farsighted statutory provision in point"
Under statutes identical to those in Draper Hall,4' the Montana Su-
preme Court sustained the validity of a blanket mechanic's lien filed
against the Glacier Condominium project in Hostetter v. Inland Develop-
37. If a lien becomes effective against 2 or more units, any unit owner may remove
the lien from his unit and from the percentage of undivided interest in the common
areas and facilities appurtenant to such unit by payment of the fractional or propor-
tionate amount attributable to his unit, such amount to be computed by reference to
the percentages appearing on the declaration. Subsequent to such payment, the unit
and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas and facilities appurten-
ant thereto shall be free and clear of the lien. Partial payment, satisfaction or discharge
as to one unit shall not prevent the lienor from proceeding to enforce his lien rights
against any other units and the percentage of undivided interest in the common areas
and facilities appurtenant thereto, for the amount attributable to such other units.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.09 (2) (1978 Supp.).
38. Stevens Construction Corp. v. Draper Hall, Inc., 73 Wis.2d 104, 242 N.W.2d 893, 899
(1976). In approving the lower court's method of apportionment, the court stated: "In this
case, where the condominium units are roughly similar in value, and where each unit has the
same share of the common area, it is reasonable to allocate, as the trial court did, 1/35th of
the total lien claims to each of the eight units in question, and enforce the lien to that extent."
Id.
39. 242 N.W.2d at 897.
40. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 703.09 (2) (1978 Supp.).
41. MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 2324 (1947) is identical to the Wisconsin statute in note 37
supra.
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ment Corp. of Montana.2 In this case, the plaintiff constructed ceramic
bathtub enclosures under a single lump sum contract. Defendant Inland
Development Corp. not only failed to complete payment to the contractor,
but also failed to secure release of several units it subsequently conveyed
in violation of a statute quite similar to its Virginia counterpart. 3 The
court found that the plaintiff, Hostetter, should be allowed to satisfy the
entire amount of its lien first from those units retained by the developer,
and if not satisfied, then proportionately from the eighteen units pre-
viously sold.44
This judicial sanctioning of apportionment between developer and unit
owner has no direct support in the statutes described,45 but rather results
from equitable considerations." Indeed, neither Montana" nor Wisconsin8
have express statutory authority for the blanket lien. One speculates as to
whether the Virginia Supreme Court will prove as flexible when the situa-
tion presents itself.9 It is interesting to note that California, which has
narrowly construed its condominium statute to apply only to situations
involving repairs and thus denied its use even by analogy in the pro-rata
allocation of liens to condominiums, 5 is a state which has a comprehensive
statutory provision for creation and apportionment of blanket liens by the
mechanic. 51
At first glance, the rather mathematical allocation of blanket liens
42. 561 P.2d 1323 (1977).
43. Compare the Montana and Virginia statutes.
At the time of the first conveyance or lease of each unit following the recording of
declaration every mortgage and every lien affecting such unit including the undivided
interest of the unit in the common elements shall be paid and satisfied of record or
the unit being conveyed or leased and its interest in the common elements shall be
released therefrom by partial release duly recorded.
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 2323 (1947).
At the time of the conveyance to the first purchaser of each condominium unit follow-
ing the recordation of the declaration . . . any mechanic's or materialmen's liens
affecting all the condominium or a greater portion thereof than the condominium unit
conveyed, shall be paid, satisfied of record, or the declarant shall forthwith have the
said condominium unit released of record from all such liens not so paid and satisfied.
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-79.46(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
44. Hostetter v. Inland Development Corp. of Montana, 561 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977).
45. See generally, MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 2323-24 (1947), notes 37 and 43 supra.
46. Hostetter v. Inland Development Corp. of Montana, 561 P.2d 1323, 1328 (1977).
47. See generally, MoNT. REV. CODES ANN. § 45-501 et seq. (1947).
48. Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 289.01 et seq. (1977-79 Cum. Supp.) (West).
49. As noted earlier, the Virginia Code is also silent here. See note 13 supra.
50. E.D. McGillicuddy Const. Co., Inc. v. Knoll Recreation Ass'n., 31 Cal. App. 3d 891,
901, 107 Cal. Rptr. 899, 905 (1973).
51. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3130 (West 1974), cited in part in note 66 and in text at note 52, infra.
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among condominiums would seem inapplicable to lots in a subdivided
property. Condominiums are homogeneous in character and, thus, work
giving rise to liens against them usually benefits each unit uniformly.
However, work done in a subdivision, particularly that of clearing and
grading, will probably vary considerably more from lot to lot depending
upon terrain and enforestation. But consider the ramifications of foreclo-
sure. In both situations, every unit is subject to sale and the mechanic
admittedly cannot allocate his efforts. Would not lot owners and other
third parties opt for a pro-rata allocation of the lien as a means for securing
partial release and avoiding a sale?
Approaching the blanket lien from the mechanic's perspective, it would
seem that the allowance of a pro-rata allocation for purposes of partial
release would also be in his best interests. He has admitted his inability
to allocate the services actually furnished by filing a blanket lien. Simi-
larly, he cannot allocate in order to secure a valid release equitable to all
parties involved. How, then, is he to effect a release of part of a multi-unit
project in exchange for part payment without sacrificing the balance of his
lien and his preferred status among creditors of a now probably insolvent
enterprise?
In sum, the developer needs the release to begin selling his units and to
regain solvency. A lienor, having expended time and money, needs the
timely partial payment to maintain his cash flow. Allowance of pro-rata
allocation based on acreage, home-size or condominium unit size as is
appropriate is one means to free the property interest for resale.
This is the answer offered by California in its statute on blanket liens,
which states in part that the mechanic "may estimate an equitable distri-
bution of the sum due him over all of such works of improvement." 2 In
the absence of statute, this method of allocation, as well as having been
judicially imposed 3 on numerous occasions, also has been upheld where
the mechanic acted on his own initiative. 4
52. Id.
53. See A.J. Raisch Paving Co. v. Mountain View S. & L. Ass'n, 28 Cal. App. 3d 832, 105
Cal. Rptr. 96 (1972); Buerger Inv. Co. v. B.F. Salzer Lumber Co., 77 Colo. 40, 237 P. 162
(1925); Manchester Iron Works, Inc. v. E.L. Wagner Const. Co., 341 Mo. 389, 107 S.W.2d 89
(1937); Associated Sand & Gravel Co. v. Di Pietro, 8 Wash. App. 938, 509 P.2d 1020 (1973).
Other cases are collected in Annot., 68 A.L.R. 3d 1300 (1976).
54. See M.R. Smith Lumber Co. v. Russell, 93 Kan. 521, 144 P. 819 (1914) (material
supplier); Coen v. Hoffman, 188 Mo. App. 311, 175 S.W. 103 (1915) (material supplier).
1979]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
B. The Single Contract Requirement
In United Masonry, Inc. v. Jefferson Mews, Inc.,55 the presence of two
factors resulted in invalidation of the lien sought. First, the plaintiff sought
enforcement of a single blanket lien for masonry work clone under two
separate contracts-one for a bathhouse common to the entire proposed
264 unit condominium and the other for work done on the initial 132 units.
Second, while an encumbrance of the entire project was acceptable for
work performed on the common bathhouse, the allowance of a lien on the
land whereon the second 132 units were to stand would burden these future
units for benefits not received. This latter objection evolved from the
court's holding that, although unbuilt, these units were effectively created
by the filing of the declaration of condominium and, though not attaching
to them, a lien on the entire property would burden them for benefits not
received. This infringement on property rights of unbuilt condominium
units was not readily apparent. The court's ruling, therefore, represents an
important caveat for would-be lienors.
Had the court found the other units not to be in existence, it would have
been faced with the prospect of denying relief merely because a contractor
working at one site for one developer had two contracts, each capable of
supporting a separate lien on identical property. This consideration may
have prompted the court to hold jointly on the basis that two separate and
distinct contracts added disproportionate values to the property sought to
be liened.6 Indeed, it could have decided the case on the single contract
criteria alone, had it been dispositive, without reaching the more complex
issue of disproportionate burdening. The injustice lies in the dispropor-
tionate burdening, not in its dual source.
In a situation where the only objection is one of form stemming from the
mechanic's failure to file separate claims, one speculates whether the un-
derlying equitable claim will prevail. As noted above, there is no statutory
mention of blanket liens, hence, there is no mandate for the single contract
criteria. This purely judicial creation would provide more flexibility if
treated merely as indicative and not determinative of a blanket lien's
validity. The few Virginia cases provide little guidance in predicting the
court's direction. On the one hand, the court's rigid approach to the crea-
tion of mechanics' liens must be considered.17 On the other, there is the
view expressed by the court in Weaver v. Harland:" "It is not the contract
55. 218 Va. 360, 237 S.E.2d 171 (1977).
56. Id. at 380, 237 S.E.2d at 183.
57. Gilman v. Ryan, 95 Va. 494, 28 S.E. 875 (1898); Trustees of Franklin St. Church v.
Davis, 85 Va. 193, 7 S.E. 245 (1888). See notes 10-12 supra.
58. 176 Va. 224, 230, 10 S.E.2d 547, 549 (1940).
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for erecting the building which creates the lien, but it is the use of the
materials furnished. . . and expended by the contractor. . . which gives
the materialman his lien under the statute. 59
Elsewhere, generally speaking, blanket liens have been most frequently
allowed in instances involving a single contract for a lump sum. 0 However,
in many other instances the mechanic had also submitted to the developer
a unit price,6" a situation held not to comply with Virginia Law" as inter-
preted by the courts." Under a similar statute,"6 early California cases held
that failure of the lien to specify how much of the material and labor was
furnished for each unit, where there was not a single lump sum contract,
did not result in invalidation of the lien, but merely resulted in subordina-
tion to other liens.15 This position, designed to protect third party creditors,
has since been codified in a specific statute.6 6 In contrast, the Virginia
Supreme Court's position seems harsh and contrary to the remedial nature
of the mechanic's lien statute,"7 denying the protection given by the legisla-
ture in the absence of specific statutory guidelines.
IV. CONCLUSION
While to date there have been few cases concerning blanket mechanic's
liens under Virginia law, the prevalence of multi-unit developments por-
tends the necessity of resolving several problems in their practical applica-
tion. Recent cases have highlighted the need for providing an equitable
manner of effecting allocation where the interests of parties other than the
mechanic and developer are involved. Practically speaking, this situation
includes nearly every multi-unit project of any size, because construction
lenders, mortgagees, and other mechanics represent an integral part of any
sizable development. The Virginia statutes give the mechanic a priority
59. Id. at 230.
60. See generally, cases collected in Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 73 (1967); Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d
1300 (1976).
61. Id.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-4 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
63. See Gilman v. Ryan, note 17 supra.
64. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1188 (enacted 1872; repealed 1951).
65. Pugh v. Moxley, 164 Cal. 374, 128 P. 1037 (1912).
66. CAL. Civ. CODE ANN. § 3130 (West 1974), provides:
In every case in which one claim is filed against two or more buildings or other works
of improvement owned or reputed to be owned by the same person or on which the
claimant has been employed by the same person to do his work or furnish his materials,
whether such works of improvement are owned by one or more owners, the person filing
such claim must at the same time designate the amount due to him on each of such
works of improvement; otherwise the lien of such claim is postponed to other liens.
67. See text and footnote supra at note 13.
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status among creditors," yet for most purposes, any attempt to release less
than all of the units it encumbers results in the surrender of this protection.
The time and expense of litigation underscore the need for an alternative
to blanket foreclosure. This is further highlighted by an examination of the
interests of the parties involved. Allocation and partial release, if sanc-
tioned, would provide a means of segmenting the lien into smaller claims
that could be more readily satisfied, thereby promoting unit sales which
would in turn provide the developer and his creditors with much needed
liquidity. Allocation would additionally furnish the innocent purchaser an
affordable means to gain clear title. It is suggested that legislative action
establishing the requirements for blanket liens and providing for their
allocation and partial release would do much toward freeing the courts to
evaluate the validity of blanket liens according to the equities involved,
rather than leaving an atmosphere of uncertainty where many claims are
invalidated on the basis of uncodified technicalities.
David L. Lingerfelt
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-17 (Repl. Vol. 1976).
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